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VOL. XVI, No. 13

MONDAY, JANUARY 22, 1923

WHOLE No. 436

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VOL. XVI, No. 13

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## DR. HARLEY ON EDUCATION

On February 18, 1921, Dr. Lewis R. Harley, Principal of the Girls' High School, Philadelphia, delivered, before the Phi Beta Kappa Association of Philadelphia, an address entitled *State Program for Public High Schools*. The address was delivered in "Reply to the Proposals of Dr. W. D. Lewis". Dr. Lewis had, I believe, a classical training in College. For some time he taught English in a High School in Syracuse, New York. Later, he was Principal of a High School in Philadelphia. Meanwhile, he had become an opponent of the Classics. His reasons for this change he stated in some articles published several years ago in the *Saturday Evening Post*, which struck me at the time as certainly not rising above the ordinary intellectual level of that much circulated sheet. By his iconoclastic attitude toward education Dr. Lewis attracted attention in various quarters, and he is now, I understand, Assistant Superintendent of Education in the great State of Pennsylvania.

In reading Dr. Harley's pamphlet recently, I noted that certain parts of it have, to me, distinct bearing on the matters which Professor H. C. Nutting, of the University of California, has been bringing, in such trenchant fashion, to the attention of the readers of *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* in connection with the pending Latin Investigation of the American Classical League. I am thinking here particularly of his recent paper entitled *Does Latin Function?*, published in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 16.42-44. In that paper Professor Nutting takes exception to the utterances of a teacher of Latin, unnamed, who, in *The Classical Journal* 17.54, had made the declaration that 99% of all the pupils studying Latin in the High Schools of this country would, beyond all question, fail ever to learn to read Latin in any real sense of the term 'read', and then, on the basis of this declaration, unsupported by evidence of any sort, went on to urge a radical change in the fundamental purpose which teachers should have before them in the teaching of Latin at all. These proposals involved (1) the abandonment of any and all attempts to teach pupils—any pupils whatever—to read Latin, and (2) the elevation to first place in the teaching of Latin in our Secondary Schools of what heretofore have been regarded by those who thought deeply of the matter at all as by-products of the teaching of Latin rather than as primary objects.

Now, Cicero had a standing way of arguing. He met the views of his opponents by saying, in effect, (1) What you say is not so; (2) Admitting for the sake of argument that it is so, what of it? In his comments on the utterances referred to above, Professor Nutting addressed himself, if I understood his paper correctly,

to both these phases of Cicero's mode of reasoning, but he laid emphasis especially on the first.

The utterances of Dr. Harley deal forcibly with the second phase of Cicero's mode of arguing. I quote from pages 10-14 of Dr. Harley's paper:

And now a few words concerning the high school situation in Pennsylvania. I believe that many of our troubles arise from thinking in quantitative terms, or in terms of mere livelihood. Dr. Maurice, who first carried higher education out to the workers in England, wrote in 1854: "All experience is against the notion that the means to produce a supply of good ordinary men is to attempt nothing higher. I know that nine-tenths of those whom the university sends out must be hewers of wood and drawers of water, but if I train the ten-tenths to be so, depend upon it the wood will be badly cut and the water will be spilt. Aim at something noble, make your system such that a great man may be formed by it, and there will be a manhood in your little men of which you did not dream". Every school program must take into account the side of human nature that does not barter and sell, the most important side of life. Human progress depends upon the careful training of this part of man's nature, the subject matter of the training to be found in science, languages, literature, mathematics and history; the results to be found in examples of restraint and discipline, of broad sympathy and civic virtue. You will agree with me that the ninety per cent of the high school students who do not go to college, and the ten per cent who do go, have a common right to share the finest culture that can be offered in the democratic state. Let us remember that the best thought of Greece was developed by men who were using one hand to win their daily bread, and the other to mould humanity. Again, if we denature the heritage of our knowledge so as to provide an easy course for the ninety per cent, to be followed by a life of mediocrity, the incentive to rise will be destroyed in the ten per cent, and what becomes of the spirit of democracy when we find no one elevated to leadership? The more democratic the state, the greater the necessity for leaders, due to wide competition and keen excitement to individual genius. Be it remembered, also, that the more democratic the form of the state, the greater the need for the reflective type of knowledge, to serve as a check to the passions of men, and to guide the masses in social and political thought. If the sovereign masses permit impulse and passion to sway their minds, they thereby invite speedy disaster to the republic; if they accept reflection and experience as their guides, their decision means an increase of civic virtue and the preservation of our institutions from decay. Plato's conclusion still holds today: "States are as the men are, they grow out of human characters". . . .

I cannot close without making a protest against the state program for suggesting an abridgment of the history courses in the high schools, particularly the almost complete removal of ancient history. Are we to have a revival of Barnes' General History, written by a diligent and versatile text-book maker in six months, and designed to be mastered by the student in fourteen weeks? Not long ago Dr. Lewis expressed in strong terms his opposition to the use of the title,

"ancient history". I may astonish him by stating that our own civilization is really older than that of Greece and Rome. Greece, especially, worked and thought in the morning of the world, and her people reflect a bright and vigorous youth. We are, in fact, the ancients, because our civilization, the accumulation of thousands of years, has its source in those once youthful lands that nestle in the peninsulas of the Mediterranean. . . .

The Greek lands lie in the path of these merchant adventurers, and her old trade routes beyond the Aegean may again become the busy avenues of commerce. That brilliant essay by George Neilson on "The Hellespont and the Aegean in Retrospect" emphasizes the likelihood of such an historical renaissance. Dr. Neilson claims that we shall never lose sight of that ancient crossing on the map of history, that political and geographical waterway that Homer knew. As we read Herodotus and Thucydides, time and space seem to disappear. The panoplied Greeks stand beside the veterans of the khaki and blue, and over the bridge of the past, the twentieth century, A. D., and the fifth century, B. C., commune together on the great problems of life. We realize that we have, as far as thought is concerned, much in common, so much, in fact, that it were folly, it were suicide, to cut the fibres of our civilization which are rooted deep in the ancient soil.

I am confident that the state program for public high schools, if adopted in its present form, will prove to be a wasteful economic policy, and that it will be destructive of the high idealism towards which men of wisdom in all ages have striven. Why erect these magnificent palaces of learning, why call into service skilfully trained teachers, why hold the pupils four years in these institutions, if the content of education is to be so reduced in quantity and quality as to leave but a beggar's pittance of the original feast? . . .

As Dr. Harley voices his objections to the narrowing of the programme of education in general in our High Schools, so I wish now, most emphatically, to voice my personal objection to any effort to narrow and degrade (for so I must regard it), the aims, purposes, and scope of instruction in Latin (and Greek) in High Schools and Colleges, by giving up the effort to teach pupils to read Latin, and to seek only to improve, through their study of Latin, their knowledge of English.

C. K.

### CHRISTIAN SPIRIT IN HORACE<sup>1</sup>

Eight years before the traditional birth of Jesus Christ, Horace died. A comparison between the character of the worldly-wise laureate of the Roman smart-set and that of the founder of our religion would be absurd, if not irreverent. Yet to those who read and love the pagan poet, and consciously or unconsciously absorb much of his philosophy of life, it may not be unprofitable to compare his character and his ethics with the doctrine of love to man, expressed by Jesus, and particularly by St. Paul in First Corinthians 1.13. It should be stated at the outset that I am basing my understanding of that chapter of chapters upon Henry Drummond's sermon, *The Greatest Thing in*

the World, in which Drummond analyzes love as though it were a ray of light passed through a crystal prism, the ingredients of the spectrum being patience, kindness, generosity, humility, courtesy, unselfishness, good-temper, guilelessness, and sincerity. A study of the extent to which these qualities are found in Horace can conveniently be separated into three broad divisions: first, Horace's attitude toward himself and his father, and toward his detractors and rivals, in other words, the personal element, with one important exception; second, his attitude toward the mass of humanity; third, his attitude toward his friends, which is the exception mentioned under the first division, but is of broad enough scope to constitute a separate division for study. While these divisions inevitably shade into each other, they will, wherever possible, be maintained for the sake of convenience.

Horace's attitude toward himself and his father must first be considered, to ascertain whether or not he possessed the Christian virtues of humility and sincerity.

In 2.7 Horace represents his slave as taking advantage of the licence of the Saturnalia to lecture him on virtue and frankly to present to him a list of his faults. According to this arraignment, Horace is inconsistent, praising the good old customs of an earlier age, but the very man to reject its simple life were some god suddenly to offer an opportunity to follow them. Horace, says the slave, either is insincere in his professions, or lacks sufficient strength of mind to avoid the luxuries by which he is surrounded in the Capital. He praises a simple diet at home, but, if a late invitation comes from his beloved Maecenas, he can not rush away with sufficient speed, leaving some humble guests of his own to curse his inconsistency, and, incidentally, the loss of their supper, in remarks not to be repeated to his face (22-37). He is discontented, longing for Rome while he is in the country, for the country when he is in Rome (28-29: compare Epp. 1. 8.12). He is hot-tempered, even to his poor slave, whom he threatens, as the latter recites the list of his faults (43-44, 116-118). His quick temper he admits also in one of his epistles, describing himself as *irasci celer* (Epp. 1.20.25; compare also 1.8.9). Furthermore, he is excessively lustful (46-74, 89-94). This we know from several other passages (1.5.82-85; 2.3.325; Epp. 1.4.33). He is over-fond of the pleasures of a rich banquet (102-109), tires of his own society, and is a prey to wretched cares (111-115). His selfrighteousness, too, is arraigned in this *Sermo*. In all this, Horace acknowledges himself more of a fool than the poor slave bought for 500 drachmae and not to be expected to control his passions (2.7. *pessim*, but especially 42-43). The piece is, to be sure, also a denunciation of selfcomplacency in general, and I understand it to apply not only to Horace, but to humanity at large. Elsewhere, however (1.4.129-131), Horace says, *ego sanus ab illis perniciem quaecumque ferunt, mediocribus et quis ignosceas vitiis teneor*. In this last passage a certain selfcomplacency is shown. The list of his faults, too, is perhaps not to be taken very seriously.

<sup>1</sup>This paper was read at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, at the University of Pittsburgh, April 29, 1922.

Unless otherwise specified, references are to the *Sermones*. It is assumed that the reader will have a copy of the text of Horace at hand.



Frequently comes the assertion of his aloofness from the masses (1.6.17-18; Carm.3.1.1), usually, it is true, in references to his literary superiority to the throng of poetasters and critics (1.4), but more than once to be interpreted of his moral and intellectual superiority (1.4.129-131, 1.6.17 ff.). Horace is frankly outspoken; he has no mock humility; but frank self-appreciation must not be mistaken even in a Christian for overweening pride. Jesus says of himself (Matthew 12.41-42), 'a greater than Jonas is here', 'a greater than Solomon is here'. Yet 2.7 clearly proves that Horace recognized a kinship in faults to his slave and did not consider himself in all respects or in every degree the better of that humble individual<sup>2</sup>.

I do not agree with Palmer, that Horace's ruling ambition "was to be the friend of the great"<sup>3</sup>. Aristocratic in his sympathies he was, to be sure, but he prized aristocracy of brains and worth as highly as that of blood. He was anything but a social climber, and ridicules that class of persons in 1.6 and 1.9. It is true that recognition of his social eminence was honey to his ears; he does not deny it (2.6.30-32, 38-58). But, though urbane and ever tactful with his powerful friends and acquaintances, he possessed a real and deep attachment for some of them, and always maintained a wholesome independence (Epp. 1.7, especially 1-39).

Sermones 1.6 contains perhaps the most nearly complete autobiographical sketch offered by the poet, and is particularly illuminating on the question of how much humility and sincerity he actually possessed. While unburdened with mock humility, Horace was thoroughly unpretentious: see 1.6.45-99. This whole Sermo is a vindication of his social position. In social, as well as in literary and other relations, Horace knew himself, and did not attempt to overstep his limits. He could not have concealed his parentage, had he so desired, as it was a matter of common knowledge at Rome, but, in his frank discussion of it, he shows the manly straightforwardness that he everywhere else displays. He clearly feels a genuine pride in the honest father who made him what he was, and acknowledges his gratitude in one of the finest tributes paid by any writer to a parent. His philosophy, which is, after all, but a more exalted name for common sense, would prompt this attitude and its frank acknowledgment, but his expressions are couched far too strongly not to bear plain witness to a gratitude and love which spring from the heart.

It might be expected that so powerful a satirist would use his weapon freely against his enemies. That his satire is a means of defence, he freely acknowledges, but he rarely appears to have used it from personal animosity (2.1.39-46). We nowhere find, in his pages, such an effusion of venom as—to quote a modern instance—we find in those of Pope, where Addison is assailed under the pseudonym of Atticus<sup>4</sup>. The subjects, moreover, of his satire are almost without

exception gross or vicious examples of the faults or the vices he would have his readers shun. His attacks on poetasters and artists such as Crispinus, Furius Bibaculus, and Hermogenes Tigellius may have been personal retaliations, but can as easily be accredited to his detestation of their poor work or their bad taste<sup>5</sup>. Scathing denunciation of those who are detrimental if not inimical to society is not inconsistent with Christianity; far less should a Pagan be expected to refrain from it, whose philosophy had not taught him love to all men as a corner-stone of his conduct. What more scathing denunciation can we find than that of the Scribes and the Pharisees which fell from the lips of the most loving of mankind (Matthew 23.13-33)?

The subject of satire leads to the second main division of this paper, Horace's attitude toward humanity at large.

Why does Horace write satire? He himself says it is from his love of writing and natural inclination for that field (2.1.1-29). The objections that he offers to it are not possible injury to some poor creature from being held up to public scorn, but that it might reflect to his own disadvantage, and a reason for giving it up, he says, would be to appease the odium his pages have brought upon him (2.1). Though he does not say that this is to be borne because of a great mission to improve public morals, he considers his writing a virtue, and pleads that, were he now to beat a cowardly retreat, he would be despised (2.3.13-14). A practical reason for the existence of satire was undoubtedly in its moral lesson to his readers. True, he wrote for only the contracted circle of his friends and their friends, and did not spread his productions broadcast to the vulgar<sup>6</sup>; yet, he was performing a useful service to those who, according to his lights, had a rightful claim upon him. The idea of duty to all men as brothers had probably never occurred to him. As is well known, he will not take either his mission or himself very seriously. When he laughs pleasantly at the superstitions of humanity, he does not, like Lucretius, strive to disillusion it (1.5.97-101). Good-humored and kindly, however, he is. His method of satire is ridicule, not, as in the case of Juvenal and Lucilius, acrimonious abuse: *Ridiculum acri fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res, et ridentem dicere verum quid vetat?* (1.10.14-15; 1.1.24-25).

In Sermones 1.4, he states that his reason for noting the faults of others is to avoid them himself, and to escape the consequences they involve; he declares, too, that this is due to his father's training (105-129). Such teaching is not the purest Christian doctrine of avoiding wrong-doing because of injury resulting to someone else, nor is it the Stoic doctrine of virtue for its own sake, yet the fault lies rather in the theory than in the practice, and Horace's life is abundant testimony to its practice, with the most beneficial results both to himself and to his fellows.

A fuller consideration of Horace's purpose and methods in satire is not within the scope of this paper,

<sup>2</sup>The same frank acknowledgement of his own superiority or limitations is plainly manifest in Horace's passages on literary criticism.

<sup>3</sup>Preface to his edition of the Satires<sup>4</sup> (1891), page xiii.

<sup>4</sup>Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot being the Prologue to the Satires.

<sup>5</sup>1.1.120-121; 1.3.137-139; 1.10.36-37; 2.5.41; 1.4.72; 1.10.17-18.

<sup>6</sup>1.4.71-78; 1.10.73-91.

and beyond the field of satire there is little evidence of his attitude toward the general run of mankind. As we know, he disdained the popular taste and judgment<sup>7</sup>. Certain faults and errors he criticises or laughs at *en masse* instead of in individuals. Yet he is always kindly and goodhumored, appears on the whole indulgent to slaves and even capable of learning from them<sup>8</sup>, denouncing cruelty toward them in others<sup>9</sup>; and his disposition seems to have been to treat everyone politely. The satire on the bore is evidence of this rather than of the contrary (1.9). The man was not a type to whom Horace could have been really beneficial, and, in visiting his sick friend, the poet was doing all that his physical energies would permit. If Horace does not appear to voice a Christian sentiment in the words *quis enim invitum servare laboret?* (Epp. 1.20.16), he tells the rich man to help the deserving needy rather than spend on extravagances (2.2.100-103), and he draws an awful picture of the loveless and forsaken end of the man who loves money more than his fellow-beings (1.1.80-91). He decries man's struggle for display and his jealousy lest his neighbor have a little more than he (Epp. 1.6.20-23), nor at the happy dinners on his Sabine estate do he and his friends spend their time discussing how much property is possessed by this man or by that (2.6.71). In the last two apparent resemblances to Christianity, self-love, the corner-stone of the Epicurean, Cyrenaic, and earlier Stoic philosophies, seems the real motive of the virtue inculcated. Man must love his fellows in order to be loved in return; his peace of mind demands contentment with his own possessions, and is inconsistent with envy and emulation. This idea is the negative rather than the positive of the Christian teaching of love and generosity because we love. But, in *Cur eget indignus quisquam te divite?* (2.2.103), Horace has surely struck a note worthy of the best in Christianity and unprompted by any selfish consideration.

The broad sociological questions that occupy so much of the modern man's time and literature are only once treated by Horace, namely, in the last part of 1.3 (96-124, especially 111-124). He is here pleading that the punishment should fit the crime, but brings up the question of public crimes and their penalties only in illustration of his plea that all faults are not equal (96-98). As a merciful gentleman he asserts that a slave should not be crucified for merely helping himself to half-eaten victuals (80-83). Laws, he says, were made for the protection of society, and a crime is not inherently a crime. The gradation of the punishment to the offence is a strong characteristic of our late nineteenth and twentieth century civilization. Two hundred years ago, in England, the law condemned a man to hang for stealing sheep. Even today, in the belief of many, the punishment is all too often entirely disproportionate to the offence. Horace, however, probably gave little thought to the social side

of his problem. This he barely touches in passing. His message is to the individual. Nor does he (unless the reference to Marius who killed his sweetheart be cited<sup>10</sup>), appear to conceive of that still more advanced attitude toward crime, growing up in our ever increasingly Christian civilization of the twentieth century, that the largest percentage of crime is due to ignorance or disease, and should be given remedial treatment for its prevention or its cure, rather than punished.

In closing this portion of the paper we must quote a significant line: *Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore* (Epp. 1.16.52). Here is the Stoic idea of virtue for its own sake, but the Stoic system does not as early as Horace's day inculcate the pursuit of virtue lest by our sin we injure our brother. Drummond, in *The Greatest Thing in the World*, says of the true Christian: "You would only insult him if you told him not to steal. How could he steal from those he loved?" And here, as I see it, lies the essential difference between pagan and Christian ethics. They may arrive at a like result, but the point of view of the one is selfish, of the other, unselfish.

We now come to the third portion of this paper, that phase of Horace's life and teachings in which the most striking resemblance to Christianity is apparent. More than in anything else in this world the natural affection of our kindly, genial bachelor was centered in his friends: *Nil ego contulerim iucundo sanus amico* (1.5.44). Let us scrutinize, in detail, his practice and his teachings concerning friendship.

The friendly relation usually involves an exchange of favors. All of Epistles 1.7 deals with this subject, but Horace's position is, perhaps, best summed up for the giver in 20-23: 'A wasteful and foolish man gives away what he scorns and despises. A good and wise man says that he is ready to give to the worthy, and is well aware of the difference between stage money and genuine bronze'. Compare the widow's mite. For the spirit in which one should receive, compare 24: 'I will show myself worthy in proportion to the desert of the giver'. We should help our friends in need: Horace speaks with horror of a man who, fearing lest he be called prodigal, would be unwilling to give a needy friend enough to keep off cold and hunger (1.2.4-6).

Among the imperative duties of friendship and of the social life of the period were those of visiting the sick<sup>11</sup>, appearing in court as surety for friends or acquaintances<sup>12</sup>, and like good offices<sup>13</sup>. But we find Horace chafing under these demands on his time and strength<sup>14</sup>. In ancient as in modern Rome they had become conventional and peremptory, binding not only on close friends but on the multitude of calling acquaintances as well. The question arises, Was it only the perfunctory duty that Horace grudged? His lingering in town longer than usual, owing to the illness of his friend, Lamia, does not seem to have been of this nature. The latter evidently needed him, and Horace

<sup>7</sup>1.6.7-44; 1.19.73-91; Epp. 1.19.35-49.

<sup>8</sup>2.7; 2.6.65-67.

<sup>9</sup>2.2.66-68; 1.3.80-86. In the last example, however, lack of forgiveness toward a friend is noted as a far more heinous crime. The principal thought is the madness and folly of cruelty to slaves, at that it made them suffer.

<sup>10</sup>2.3.276-280. The madness mentioned in this Sermo is, doubtless, not to be taken very seriously. Compare 37-46.

<sup>11</sup>1.9.17-18; Epp. 1.14.6-9, 2.2.68-70.

<sup>12</sup>1.3.94-95; 2.6.23-28; Epp. 2.2.65-67.

<sup>13</sup>2.6.32-37; Epp. 2.2.65-68.

<sup>14</sup>2.6.16-39, 59-62; Epp. 1.14.6-9, 2.2.65-70.

was here practising what he preached and assisting a friend in distress. Yet his mind and heart were drawn to the country, and he longed to burst the bars that stood in his way (Epp. 1.14.8-10). This probably shows that he found staying with the sick less of a pleasure than a duty. Still, so genuinely affectionate a nature as Horace's seems to have been must have suffered in common with his distressed friend, and we must beware of taking his frank expression of longing for the country as indicating a real desire to abandon him.

Apropos of Horace's general helpfulness to his friends arises the question of recommendations of them by him to his powerful friends and patrons. Horace was so recommended to Maecenas by Varius and Vergil (1.6.54-55). In Epistles 1.9 he in turn recommends Septimius to Tiberius, but exhibits extreme hesitancy in so doing. Why this hesitancy? Three interpretations have suggested themselves to me. First, was Septimius suited to the place? If not, is it a requisite of even Christianity to thrust one's friend upon a company to which he would be uncongenial? Certainly such complaisance was distasteful to a society man of Horace's tact. Yet Horace's ideals of friendship, we must remember, unlike the broad conceptions of Christianity in its purest form, were narrowed to the circle of his intimates, and, therefore, if not more intense, may be supposed to have been blinder and less scrupulous, that is, to have favored the interests of a friend, just or unjust, even when prejudicial to those of a stranger or mere acquaintance; and that Horace was not intimate with Tiberius is clearly indicated by this epistle. Reasonably certain, then, as we are that Horace falls far short of the Christian idea of universal brotherhood, we must, if Septimius was an undesirable man for the place, believe that our poet in writing so luke-warm a recommendation was prompted by self-love, a fear of losing personal prestige which is naturally at the root of almost any man's reluctance to recommend an incompetent friend to a distinguished and powerful acquaintance. We know that Horace was morbidly careful not to ask favors for himself<sup>15</sup>, and, in others of his writings, his reluctance to ask them for others is clearly indicated<sup>16</sup>.

Another interpretation that might be placed on this letter is, that Horace adopts a tone of reluctance and emphasizes the slightness of his acquaintance with Tiberius (5-6), the rather to place the prince in a position where it would be awkward for him to refuse. It certainly seems that this is the result that might have been anticipated from such a letter, and Professor Rolfe, in the Introduction to his edition of the Epistles, states his opinion that the recommendation was actually successful or the letter would never have been published.

A third, and to me most plausible, interpretation, is a mingling of the other two: that Septimius was worthy, but that Horace, true to his customary tactfulness and independent spirit, was extremely loath, even for a friend, to assume the rôle of applying for favors to the great. Another element to be considered is the character of Tiberius. If it was as cold and ungenial as most

authorities maintain, small wonder that the bard felt a hesitation even in his letter. And that he felt this hesitation is to me apparent, not because his friend, whom he calls *fortem bonumque*, was unworthy, but because he distrusted his own influence and dreaded to be thought by the young Nero a seeker of favors.

We here have a specimen of his practice. Perfectly consonant with this is his theory, which offers one of the most striking examples of the fundamental difference between Christianity and the philosophy that Horace had absorbed from Aristippus and others. Mark the sentiment expressed in his advice to Lollius (Epp. 1.18.76-85):

'Those whom you recommend consider again and again, lest you presently be brought to shame by another's faults. We make mistakes and sometimes introduce unworthy men; therefore, if you are deceived, do not protect one who is overwhelmed by his own fault; while, if he whose character you thoroughly know be assailed by false charges, stand by him and protect him, for he relies on your support. When such a man is gnawed by envy's tooth, do you not perceive that dangers shortly after are coming upon you? For your property is concerned when the wall next you is on fire, and neglected conflagrations gather strength'.

This passage shows that Horace believed, for selfish reasons, in wariness to recommend others, and that, if the friend who had obtained favor through him fell by his own fault, our poet did not feel called on to assist him. He believed in standing by an innocent friend lest in his brother's fall personal harm should come to himself.

In the same letter, when advising Lollius to take an interest in his patron's amusements, even at the expense of his own, Horace seems to hint, in the story of Amphion and Zethus, that we should act toward a friend's amusements as toward a brother's (39-45). And yet, again, we meet the ever-resounding note: 'He who believes that you sympathize with his pursuits will favor and be loud in his praise of your pastimes' (65-66).

Respect for a patron's confidences is also urged (Epp. 1.18.37-38), and Lollius is warned to be wary to whom he speaks and of whom he speaks, but rather lest indiscretion involve him personally in difficulty than that it might injure another (Epp. 1.18.67-71). Yet Horace cannot sufficiently express his horror of betraying a friend's secrets (1.3.94-95, 1.4.84-85). Criticism behind a friend's back he brands as one of the blackest of sins, and is equally strong in his abhorrence of failure to defend an absent friend (1.4.81-85). This is in refreshing contrast to his advice to Lollius not to stand by a friend whom he has recommended to a powerful patron, but who has fallen by natural unworthiness, and, we may well believe, represents Horace's normal attitude. The sin of not defending an absent friend, which he deems so culpable, is not the same thing, however, as failure to support a man who has deservedly lost the favor of one's patron. Horace's patron, Maecenas, was truly his dearest friend, so that, in Horace's conception, the interests of such a patron would easily transcend those of a man who had proved

<sup>15</sup>Epp. 1.7; 1.17.43-51.

<sup>16</sup>1.9.43-60; 2.6.38-59.



unworthy of his recommendation. Nevertheless, the doctrine expressed in the letter to Lollius is the most selfish and unchristian in tone that we find in our poet.

But of all his teachings the one most thoroughly Christian is that—to use Christian phraseology—of 'Judge not, that ye be not judged', which is the dominant strain of 1.3 and 2.3. Even in these *Sermones* the basic principle of the teaching is 'Bear with thy brother's faults, that he may also bear with thine'<sup>17</sup>, while the purest Christian ethics places the burden on our love for our brother. An excellent text for 1.3 is found in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* (iv.3): "It is not meet that every nice offence should bear his comment." Horace does not say what he would do in case a friend betrayed his confidence or denied his bond (1.3.94-95). We are not informed how far he would consider that 'Judge not, that ye be not judged' should go, and whether he would extend it to Christian forgiveness for a serious injury. But note the tone of 1.3.9-95, and compare the parable of the mote and the beam.

Throughout this paper I have tried to get at the truth of Horace's character and teachings. If I have emphasized his selfishness, it was in an effort not to be led astray by striking apparent likenesses to Christianity. Yet the real difference is usually found in the fundamental point of view of the pagan and Christian ethical systems, not in the character of the poet. Although he lived in an era before the beneficent teachings of Jesus gained that grip on the Western world which modified the course of history and man's attitude to man, the actual result of his kindly disposition and theories was to make a man endowed to a large extent with virtues that would to-day be indistinguishable from those of a Christian. He seems to have had, more than many would-be Christians, much of patience, kindness, generosity, humility, courtesy, sincerity, good-nature, if not always good-temper, and more unselfishness than would appear from this paper.

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### REVIEWS

*La Fortuna di Pitagora presso i Romani dalle Origini fino al Tempo di Augusto.* By Alberto Gianola. Catania: Francesco Battiato (1921). Pp. viii + 208. Lire 7.50.

This is Volume XV of the *Biblioteca di Filologia Classica*, published under the editorial direction of the enterprising and indefatigable Professor Carlo Pascal, now of the University of Pavia, formerly of Catania, who has himself contributed five volumes to the series.

The author of the book here under review states, in his Preface, that the studies now assembled were in great part published separately, or in journals, from 1904 onwards, but have been revised. This remark obviously applies to the main body of the work, which includes an Introduction; Chapter I, *Legendary and Historical Beginnings* (5-20); Chapter II, *Quintus Ennius and His Times* (21-44); Chapter III, *Pytha-*

*gorean Sects and Schools at Rome in the First Century B. C.* (45-68); Chapter IV, *Pythagoras and his Doctrines in Latin Writers of the First Century B. C.* (69-162), in which are discussed Lucretius (69-90), Varro (91-105), Appian Claudius Pulcher (107-110), Cicero and the *Somnium Scipionis* (110-122), the *Mimes* (123-126), Horace (126-128), Vergil (128-148), and Ovid (149-162). In the Appendix are added two studies, apparently republished without change, dealing respectively with Euphorbus (165-179) and the Pythagorean Brotherhood of Crotona (183-208).

Every student who has at all seriously considered the singularly attractive figure of Pythagoras and the reports regarding him and the 'School' called after his name is aware of the grave difficulties which beset the historian when he endeavors to arrive at the truth. The Pythagorean 'Order' or institution was forcibly broken up and the Master was either slain in the *mêlée* or died elsewhere shortly afterwards. What was henceforth to be regarded as Pythagorean became therefore a question by no means easily answered, especially as the older sources have little to report about Pythagoras and his doctrines, and the later tradition represents his teachings as having been long guarded as secrets. In a literary way there is a clear break. Aristoxenus, at the close of the fourth century B. C., presumably was in touch with those who might yet speak with some authority of the opinions and the practices of the 'Order' as reported by a living oral tradition; then follows a period, to be likened to the umbra or penumbra of an eclipse, lasting about two centuries, after which the world again heard much of the wonderful Pythagoras, returned in added splendor. The 'School' which then arose is commonly called Neo-Pythagorean. Of course this statement must not be regarded as absolutely accurate: there was no time when there were not men who cherished ideals and held opinions (generally combined with those of other teachers, notably Plato) which we may call Pythagorean; but in general the above statement may be allowed to stand. In later centuries, many were claimed (e.g. by Iamblichus) as Pythagoreans who presumably had no relation whatever to the 'Order' and would in all probability have been excluded from it, if it had existed in their time.

Signor Gianola is no doubt aware of all this, or at least that there are those who would say it, though he is so much concerned with the problem of bridging the chasm that he will not emphasize the difficulties which confront him. The faith which inspires him is obviously born of the hope that, Pythagoras having founded his 'Order' and having exercised his potent influence in Italy, a continuous tradition regarding him will be found to have maintained itself in that land. The solid ground under his feet, from which he hopes to leap the gap, is furnished by Ennius, who may be supposed to have learned of Pythagoras at Tarentum, where Pythagoreanism certainly did flourish; and it may be regarded as certain that the cities of Magna Graecia cherished the name and the fame of the sage to whom the district owed much of its renown. But whether the specific content of the tales there told about him was

<sup>17</sup>1.3.69-75; 2.3.298-299, the positive of 'Judge not, that ye be not judged'; compare 2.3.48-53, where the thought is that he who laughs at you is no wiser than you.



furnished by a genuine tradition, or grew, as legends generally grow, on a slender stalk, and attained its proportions largely by accretions from foreign literary sources, is a question in itself difficult and quite ignored by our author. That he should so lightly accept the exceedingly doubtful, if not certainly spurious, reports of the finding of Numa's books intact in a tomb will count heavily against him in the judgment of every sober historian. One inevitably feels that the writer is catching at a straw in order to convince himself that he has actually found at least the remnant of a bridge.

In the chapters dealing with the first century B. C., there is much that may rightly claim the interest of students of Roman literature; but the historian of philosophy will be grieved to discover that the writer has made no serious effort to distinguish ideas which might reasonably be referred specifically to known exponents of the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy from those which simply belong to the eclectic and syncretistic popular philosophy of the day, which owed its existence and its appeal to the circumstance that it was in fact a semirationalized religion.

The reviewer derived most pleasure from the essay, in the Appendix, on the Pythagorean Brotherhood at Crotona. Here, as elsewhere, the author displays no tendency to subject the literary sources to a critical evaluation, a failure which is necessarily fatal to discriminating history; but the opinion he formed of the aims of Pythagoras seems to be on the whole correct. Pythagoras is, to his view, a friend of man, who sought to lead his fellows into the true way of life—a whole life, including that of religion, of morality, of society, and of the mind. With this view I agree, provided that one substitutes 'the Pythagoreans' for 'Pythagoras'. One would like to attribute the many-sidedness of the 'School' to the Master, but of him we know too little. Possibly the harmonious many-sidedness which appears in the tradition as characteristic of the School was really due to the diversity of nature among those whom the Master attracted. So Socrates appealed to men of very different natures; and the largeness and the permanence of his influence are in no small measure due to the fact that each disciple appropriated that which his mind best grasped and his heart most desired. Pythagoreanism was or became a religion; the Pythagorean 'Way of Life' was in its fashion as comprehensive as the 'Christian life'. As the latter will on any view include aspects and interests which the life of the Master is not known to have displayed, so it may well have been in the case of Pythagoras. This, however, is avowedly speculation, and does not purport to defend itself by citations of Iamblichus and his kind.

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Classical Associations of Places in Italy. By Frances E. Sabin. Boston: Marshall Jones Company (1921). Pp. 526. \$5.00.

This book is exactly what, according to its title, it purports to be.

Miss Sabin begins with two passages, one from Vergil, the other from Pliny, relating to Italia, with translations of the passages (6-11). The citations form a fine introduction to the rest of the book, to which every lover of Italy would readily subscribe. Places in Italy, one hundred and seventy-five in number, beginning with Alba Longa and continuing to Volturnus Flumen, are then presented in alphabetical order (12-511). The presentation consists of passages from Greek or Roman authors, or both, discussing the place in question, accompanied by the best available translations in English, on the opposite page. In very many cases, introductory notes and footnotes give further information or elucidation. Besides, a number of maps and plans are furnished; illustrations also abound. An excellent Index appears at the end (523-526), by which all references to individual places and passages may be conveniently located. The classical passages are, in every case, concerned either with a description of the place or with the life and the history of the people; their total is over five hundred.

This book will make an appeal to many classes of readers: it will be of great value for travelers to Italy who are at the same time lovers of the Classics; it will be of interest to all people of scholarly taste, not professional classicists, who will find, here, many old friends in the way of familiar passages and many passages not so well known—all conveniently arranged, geographically; it will prove of value to teachers of the Classics in general, who will be able to use the book to supplement the reading in many an author, as Plautus, Caesar, Cicero, Vergil, Livy, Horace, Ovid, Seneca, and Pliny, for the material, though arranged geographically, touches on *all* aspects of ancient Italian life. More advanced students, whether in College or in the American Academy at Rome, will find Miss Sabin's book most convenient, howsoever familiar they may be with the works of Platner, Richter, Huelsen, Nissen, Hare, Smith, Lanciani, and Abbott. For the plan of citing ancient texts, with translations, and allowing these to speak for themselves does not conflict with the method of other books already in use.

A line had to be drawn somewhere, for one volume could hardly aim at an exhaustive treatment or collection of all of the material Miss Sabin had assembled. But in her selection Miss Sabin has shown judgment. In almost every case, sufficient material is presented to make the ancient place live again through the words of the ancient spokesman. Rome naturally claims major attention. The captions here are: General Comment (284-287), Life in Rome (288-309), and Places in Rome (310-413). Readers will turn with interest to the passages dealing with other large cities, as Naples and Milan, and also to those concerned with many smaller places. In the case of Pompeii, I felt a certain disappointment, but in the case of others, as Baiae, Capua, and Ostia, many a pleasant surprise will reward the search.

A rearrangement of the material included in this volume readily makes it a handbook or source-book on ancient life, both public and private, because religion,

games, engineering, politics, and home-life are among the topics discussed in the passages cited. The chief value of the book, as I see it, is that it will tend to break the old mould for many teachers in Secondary Schools who are limited in their vision to a partial knowledge of the texts of Caesar, Cicero, and Vergil. What we need, more than aught else, in our school-masters' teaching of Latin is a wider acquaintance with classical authors. Equally essential are text-books with matter, *topically arranged*. Not a teacher of Latin ought to be without this book for constant reference and use. The stories of Roman history and of Roman life, the stories even about the triad of authors, Caesar, Cicero, and Vergil, who remain the foundation of our Latin teaching, will prove most interesting to teacher and student alike. If we must continue with the established texts as the basis of our reading, it does not follow that students of the Latin language should not be initiated into a wider revelation of Rome and Italy, as classical authors have portrayed these. Vitality lies in almost every page of this book, and that means a living reality of the ancient life and an immediate recognition of its unity with the life of today.

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Diogenes Laertius: *Leben und Meinungen Berühmter Philosophen*. Übersetzt und Erläutert von Otto Apelt. 2 volumes. Leipzig: Felix Meiner (1921). Pp. xxviii + 341; iv + 327. Marks 90.

Diogenes Laertius compiled a book which is in many ways tantalizing and is yet altogether indispensable to the student of ancient Greek philosophers and philosophy. The best available text of the whole work is that of Cobet (Didot), which was published without an apparatus criticus because of a dispute between the editor and his publishers. It contains a Latin version only partially corrected by Cobet, who said of it, "*Cette traduction latine est l'étable d'Augias*". With equal propriety one might apply this description to the translation of C. D. Yonge (Bohn), which is, so far as I know, the only one in English; and certain handbooks intended for the use of English-speaking students have been sadly defaced by incorporating extensive extracts from it, thus at least apparently sanctioning its faults. Diogenes was himself a rather less than indifferent master of Greek, and the fortunes of his book—whatever they were—have added to the difficulties of the text; besides, in good part we are here dealing with late Greek writers, whose diction is little studied and inadequately treated in the lexicons. One will look in vain in Liddell and Scott for many a Greek word occurring in this book, and, if one should find the word, the meaning given is quite likely wrong. English scholarship in the Classics has confined itself largely to the relatively few great writers, and many a scholar of great reputation would have to confess, if he

were equally frank, as Gilbert Murray did ten years ago, "I cannot pretend to feel anything like the same clearness about the true meaning of a passage in Philo or the Corpus Hermeticum that one normally feels in a writer of the classical period". The causes of this obscurity (to us) are in general not far to seek; for they lie in us rather than in the ancient texts. No one will contend that Philo's diction is more irregular than that, say, of Sophocles: the difference is due to the fact that the same order of scholarship and the same loving attention have not been devoted to the lesser writers.

We may look forward to another day in classical scholarship, when the attention of scholars will not be so exclusively given to the esthetic values and hence to the few incomparable exemplars; but it will be seen that the problems presented by the great poets and prose writers are often to be solved by knowledge which can at present be gained only by wide reading in hitherto neglected fields. The important critical advances made in the last generation will upon careful consideration confirm this statement. At the foundation of all study of the ancient texts lies the preparation of genuinely critical editions. For Diogenes Laertius this task has not yet been accomplished, though an edition is now in preparation. Those portions which deal with the Pre-Socratics, with the Stoics, and with Epicurus have already been greatly improved by Diels, von Arnim, and Usener, not to mention many corrections in detail made by a large number of scholars. The way has been largely prepared and the desired edition should not be much longer delayed. In Germany and England almost every classical scholar has some acquaintance with Greek philosophy and sometimes busies himself with Diogenes Laertius; in America they are few who make his acquaintance.

The translation offered by Dr. Apelt does not pretend to serve as a substitute for the required critical edition; it is frankly intended for the general reader who may wish to acquaint himself with the data furnished by this indispensable source-book. Taken as a whole the translator's work is thoroughly satisfactory, as one who knows his competent rendering of Plato would expect to find it. Some 64 pages of notes are appended, which give desirable information touching dates of authorities cited, and, occasionally, the result of the latest critical discussions of the text. The latter notes are of course extremely incomplete and inadequate; for Dr. Apelt is in this instance imperfectly acquainted with the literature of the subject. But no one will find serious fault with him for his failure at this point, because he did not profess to do more than he has actually accomplished.

I have not read through the whole work, but have read quite carefully a considerable number of chapters, and may say that few serious errors will be found in the translation. Dr. Apelt's German reads easily and is thoroughly idiomatic. It is to be hoped that American students will read his Diogenes Laertius.

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